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AMERICA'S
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VIEWS AND PRIORITIES
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Published by TransAfrica, the Black American Lobby for Africa and the
Caribbean in collaboration with the following national organizations :
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INI'RODUcrION

For two terms , the Reagan administration has conducted a vigorous
campaign to subvert most of the rrodest gains made by black America
over the past twenty years . This campaign has been comprehensive,
affecting both our domestic as well as foreign policy interests .
Cutbacks in spending on social services have parallelled reduced
development assistance to ~rican and Caribbean nations . Increased
defense expenditures have also enabled the administration t o boost
military aid t o friendly dictators and insurgent groups in these
regions. Opposition to civil rights at home has gone hand in hand
with greater sympathy and support for the racist minority regime in
South Africa . The examples are many and distressing.
~s African- Americans, we are resolved to prevent such a concerted and
debilitating assault on our v ital interests from happening again. As
a first step we will endeavor to inform the .l\merican people and policy
makers about the dangers to J\merica 's interests resulting from the
present course. In this document, we have focused on U. S. policies
toward Africa and the Caribbo....an. We have selected the major areas of
concern, and proposed alternative positions consistent with American
ideals and national interest.

We are mindful of our domestic problems and priorities but we recall
that in the afterrrath of the second world war , the United States
emb3rked on an ambitious program to rebuild the economies of post- war
Europe. The Marshall plan is today rightfully considered one of the
finest foreign policy accomplishments of our nation .
The people of Afri ca and the Caribbean today need our support. Gi ven
the vast human and material resources of these regions, we are certain
that whatever help we provide now will be mutually beneficial in the
future.
This document will serve as a brief record of our pos itions on the
critical issues af~ting U.S. relations with Africa and the
Caribbean . We have published it as a service to policy makers with
the hope that they use i t as a convenient reference. Detailed
analyses of the various issues dealt with in this docll.ITl°J1t can be
obtained by contacting TransAfrica.

SUMMARY
The following are the key recomnendations:
A.

B.

C.

U.S. Role in African Economic Development
1.

The level of U. S. assistance to Africa should be
substantially increased from its current level of about
$723 mi llion to between $2 and $3 billion a year

2.

The U.S . should support morally and materially t he new
five- year United Nations program for African Recovery and
Develor;>ment

3.

The U.S. should act now to ameliorate Africa's crushing
debt burden

4.

The U.S. should de- emphasize security assistance which is
now provided mainly to support a few dictatorships.

U. S. Role in Caribbean Economic Development
1.

The Caribbo....an Basic Initiati ve should be rrodif ied to
provide improved access and financing for Caribbean
products into the U.S

2.

U.S. policy should be to avoid military interventions in
the region since they promote instability a nd retard
development

3.

U.S. must devise a comprehensive plan to support democracy
and economic developrnoJ1t in Haiti

U.S. Role in ending apartheid
1.

Stringent and comprehensive sanctions by the U.S. and the
international community should be supported.

2.

~11 the countries in t he Southern Africa Development
Coordination Conference (SA.CCC) should receive U. S.
assistance to help them defend against South Africa's
campaign of destabilization.

3.

The government of Angola should be recognized and aid to
the South African supported National Un i on for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel group should be
discontinued.

4.

Mozambique should rece ive more U.S. ass i s t a nce and

cooperation and the South African sponsored Mozambique
National Resistance (MNR or RENAMO) group should be
vigorously condemned.
Independence for South African occupied Namibia under the
guidelines of United Nations resolution 435 should be
supported and not linked to the presence of CUban troops
in l\ngola

5.

D. U. S . Role in Support of Human Rights

1.

The U.S. should make the defense of human rights a central
consideration in providing assistance to African and
caribbean countries

2.

The rights of womoJ1 and t.~eir role in economic developmo--nt
should be promoted in U.S . developITFJ1t assistance
programs

I.

U.S. ROLE IN AFRICA 1 S :OCONOMIC DEVEIOPMENI'

A. The current level of develop1Tl""-11t assistance provided to subSaharan Africa is indefensibly low and must be substantially increased
to prorrote long term development .
Opinion polls demonstrate that the American P20ple favor meaningful
economic aid that will enable Africa to participate fully in the world
economic system. Congress and various administrations have shown
instead a distressing inability and unwillingness to support aid that
goes beyond disaster relief. This lack of support has harmed American
interests in the region and allowed a cycle of human suffering and
environmo__ntal degradation to continue.
Afr i ca today is facing an economic crisis of immense proporti ons .
43 countries classi f i ed by the IMF as the world ' s lowest income
countr i es , 28 are in Africa . The Gm> of many ,Zl,,frican countries
calculated in r eal terms is bel ow that of 1970.

Of

Yet U. S. government aid t o sub- Saharan Africa dropped 24 percent last
year - to $739 million i n 1987 from $972 mill i on in 1986 . Canada,
with an economy only a fraction the size of the U. S. now gives Africa
rrore aid than the United States --$950 mill i on in 1987 .
I n fact whi l e the U. S. offici al development assistance program is the
largest i n the world in absolute terms , i t ranks behind sixteen other
industr i al nations when measured as a percentage of national wealth .
This fact a nd the l ow priority accorded to Africa by policyrrakers
contributes to the decreasing amounts provided to Africa .
Fai l ure to provide Africa with additional assi.:;t ance not only ensures

continuing poverty and instability, it deprives the U. S. of a
potential rrarket of well over four hundred million people for U.S.
products and services. This is shortsighted. In ITB.ny par ts of Afr ica
today, U.S . influence is threatened not by Soviet troops but by
Japanese, Brazilian, Taiwanese , GerITB.n, and Korean and other
businessmen whose countries are paying greater attention to developing
rrarkets for their products in Africa . Increased assistance to Africa
should be a key component of any comprehensive strategy to improve
U.S. economic perforrrance. Since it is -well established that most of
t he money appropriated for developmo_nt assistance is spent at home on
U.S. goods and services, it becomes not only betrayal of Americans
ideals to respond half- heartedly to Af~ica's plight; it is also an
unwise r e jection of a sound strategy for expanding the U.S . economy.
B. Africa, the region most in need of U. S. assistance, should not be
getting the snallest proportion of such assistance.
I n a survey conducted by two Arrerican organisations working on
international development issues~Interaction and the Overseas
Developrrent Council-- a plurality of Americans chose Africa as a high
priority for recei ving United States development aid. In practice,
policymakers accord Africa t he lowest priority . I n FY 1987, the
Middle East, Latin America and the Caribb<:>....an, and Asia ranked higher
than ~frica in t erms of percentage of U. S. foreign assistance
received. Over $5 billion of the $13.37 billion appropriated by
Congress went to just Israel and Egypt. ~he 460 million people of
sub- Saharan ~rica received less than two dollars per Capita while
Israel for example, received about one thousand dollars per Capita .
Clearly foreign aid is not provided on the basis of developmental
needs. Sub- Saharan Africa is the world's most economically depressed
region with more than a million Africans dead of starvation in the
continuing famine. No region has rrore children going t o bed hungry or
people out of work or babies dying before reaching their first
birthday than sub-Saharan Africa .
Tragically, there is a dominant belief among policymakers that
sub-Saharan Africa ranks at the bottom in terms of U. S. strategic
interests . This view is uninformed and indefensible. Africa is
perhaps the richest continent in terms of natural resources. With
nearly 500 million people, it is a huge potential market for U.S.
products and services. Africa is also the ancestral homeland of
thirty million black Americans who will increasingly question
America's vvorld role if Africa continues to receive inadequate
assistance.
Present U.S. policy essentially concedes Africa to other interests .
In the long term, it would cost the U.S. more to intervene in Africa
militarily than to participate now in its economic developrrent.
The blatant discrimination which characterizes U. S. development policy
is not lost on the Africans themselves or on African- Americans and
objective observers. It is well past the time for the U.S. to begin
t reating Africa equitably in the prov i sion of de ve lopment assistance.

C. The United States should join other developed nations in providing
concrete support for the "UN Programme of Action for 7\frican Economic
Recovery and Development 1986-1990."
After years of listening to criticisms of t heir economic policies,
African nations have developed a bold new program for economic
progress. This program, influenced heavily by the advice of Western
development experts, was unveiled at an historic special session of
the UN General Assembly on the "Critical Economic Situation in
Afr ica." The session, the first ever held by the United Nations to
consider the economic situation of a specific region, took place at
the request of the leaders of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
Its purpose was to mobilize international resources for the
continent's recovery and rehabilitation after the devastation of its
worst drought and famine in memory.
The General Assemblv unanimously adopted the program on 1 June 1986.
Under the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic
Recovery and Development 1986-1990, the world community agreed to
support the comprehensive initiatives being undertaken by 7\fricans to:
1.
2.
3.
4.

promote food production;
develop agricultural industries and related infrastructure;
reverse the effects of drought and desertification;
develop hurran resources through fundamental changes in the
educational system.

~ estimated $128.1 billion will be needed over the next five years.
The African countries expect to provide $82.5 of this amount and are
counting on the international corrrnunity to provide the balance of
$45.6 billion .

To implement the program, the African countries have agreed to rrake
basic changes in their economies, focussing on reforms in the
agricultural sector. To the surprise of rrany international
development experts, the African countries have rroved rapidly to rrake
the necessary reforms despite social, economic and political costs.
Within one year of the adoption of the programme, 25 of the 45
independent sub- Saharan states had satisfied the.UN guidelines, which
include cutting government bureaucracies, paying farmers fairer
prices, and setting realistic exchange rates. These guidelines are at
the core of reforms pushed by the western nations for years .
Curiously, now that the Africans are embracing the economic reforms,
the West, especially the U.S., appears to be retreating from any
meaningful economic role i n 7\frica. As Canada's Minister for External
Relations, Monique l,andrv stated, "whether we look at aid or debt or
trade, the rich countries have not yet lived up to their part of l ast
years economic recovery pact [the United Nations Programme]."
Now more than ever before, the U.S. must ta~e the l ead . The cycle of
drought and famine followed by international relief must be broken.

Africa needs assistance that will enable it to sustain long term
structural development . Without the active leadership of the U.S.,
all the efforts undertaken so far will be in vain. The new realism
and determination of African leaders and the sacrifices of the African
people must not be betrayed.
We urge the U.S. government to live up to its promises by providing
concrete support for the UN program for African economic recovery.
Specifically, we ask the U.S. goverr1ffiPJ1t to commit itself to providing
a substantial pro?Qrtion of the $45 billion needed by Africa during
the next five years.
Forty ye ars ago, the U.S. initiated the ambitious Marshall plan to
rebuild post-war Western Europe. For equally valid humanitarian and
national security considerations, the U. S. must consider now a similar
commitinent to Africa.
Other ways in which U.S . policy should be adjusted to assist the
African e fforts include the adoption of equitable, non-inflationary
growth strategies which would facilitate increased trade. The
rejection of protectionism, particularly non-tariff barriers, and
improved market access for African pr oducts at higher prices should be
essential components of such U. S. policy.
D. Africa's escalating debt- servicing burden would doom any effort to
lift Africa out of its continuing economic en.sis. U.S. leadership in
devising means of ameliorating this burden is needed irrnnediately.

Sub-Saharan Africa's foreign debt of about $100 billion- while much
srraller than Latin Arnerica's (over $400 million)- is more debilitating
because of the depressed nature of African economies. An
international consensus has emerged on the need for special measures
to alleviate the burden. It is generally accepted that without such
measures, Africa's determined efforts at reform and recovery are bound
to fail.
Despite their depressed economies, rrany African countries are
experiencing net outflows of v.iealth to the richer mations. According
to the Economic Ccxrmission for Africa CECA) , Africa lost about $30
billion in 1985- 86 because of a combination of falling community
prices and rising debt payment. It is calculatep that Africa's debtservice payments will rise from an annual average of $4.3 billion
during 1980-1982 to between $14.6 and $24.5 billion per year during
the 1986 to 1990 period .
Indeeed, the increasing impact of the debt burden coupled with the
"financial famine" that Africa is now experiencing has forced some
countries to temporarily curb their reformist policies . Even Ivory
coast - widely praised in the West for its rmrket oriented economic
policies - announced in May 1987 that it could not keep up with $1. 18
billion payments due this year on its over $8 billion foreign debt.
Zambia was forced to abandon its accord with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) because oE rrounting opposition to its austere

measures . Both countries were victimized by reduced incomes and
restricted a ccess to financing.
A source of hope is the fact t hat the proportion of Afr i can debt owed
t o the private sector i s rel atively smal l unlike the debt owed by
other regions of the worl d. About BO percent of the total foreign
debts of poor Af rican countr i es is owed to western governments and
multilateral agencies like the world bank and the International
Monetary Fund . The real cost for creditor countries of African debt
relief would be modest relative to the cost for other regions of the
world.
Yet until recently l ittle attention was paid to Africa. Now that
consensus is building among western countries- notably Britain , France ,
Canada and Italy, the U. S. is still lukewarm. The U. S. persists in
pushing for individual negotiat ions between credi tor and debtor
nations . There has been a reluctance to accept that rrany African
countries simply cannot afford to repay their debts . Rescheduling and
re financing are options which obscure the reality that some of the
current debt is efectively in default and is likely to rerrain so.
U.S . recalcitrance, coupled with the sharp drop in U.S. bilateral
assistance to Africa over the past three years, contributed
significantly to the worsening of Z\frica ' s plight . It has also become
one of the biggest obstacles to Africa ' s recovery. The U. S. should
realize that despite bei ng the biggest contributor t o Afr i ca famine
relief , it has to take the lead i n international efforts to ensure
that Africa would never face another such crisis again. The first
step would be for the U. S. to join the eff orts of the world bank and
other western government to devise a comprehensive debt relief plan
for l\frica . The many Z\frican governments that have followed U.S.
advice and instituted economic reforms cannot survive much l onger
without international support, beginning with debt relief.
E. Security assistance programs should be separated from development
assistance programs and the former should be de- e'Tlphasized in U.S .
relations with sub-Saharan Africa.
The amount spent on security assistance reflects a severe distortion
in the U.S . foreign aid program . In FY 1986, security assistance
accounted for $9 . 6 billion of t he $14.8 bi l l ion foreign aid budget .
Thi s ratio of two- thirds security a s s istance to pne- third
developmental assistance is expected to continue in FY'87 and FY ' B8 .
Africa is victimized at tl.olO l evels by t his overemphasis on security
assistance :
1.

Since security assistance programs are for countries
deemed strategic and s i nce much of sub- Saharan Africa i s
not considered strategic , the region is virtually
frozen out of consideration for about t"WO- thirds of t he
foreign aid budget .

2.

The tiny pro[X)rtion of the s ecur ity assistance budget

which goes to a few African countries ~an amount that is
quite significant relative to the total foreign aid
package for sub-Saharan Africa --is essentially used to
support unpopul ar regimes whose principal enemies are
their own people.
It is clear, given this country's involvement in the Middle- East that
Africa cannot receive adequate consideration for developmental
assistance when security assistance and developmental assistance are
considered jointly. We propose a U.S . comnitment to African
developmo_nt removed from discussions about short-term U. S. security
concerns. The primary goal of such a commit..rno_nt would be to develop
and expand industries and markets in Africa that \f./Ould enable the
region to make positive contributions to v.-orld peace and progress .
This corrmitment should complemo_nt the current downward trend in arms
transfer to Africa by de-emphasizing r e l ationships based on short term
security considerations. ~frican leaders 1.17110 build up their military
capabilities do so at the expense of a social development . They use
the weapons to suppress their people and they are frequently the cause
of regional instability. Countries which cannot afford to pay for
military hardware should not be subsidized through the U.S . foreign
aid program . The U.S. should concentrate on using aid to help develop
the economies of countries which can contribute t o the growth of the
U. S . own economy .

II.

U. S. ROLE IN CARIBBEP.i.\l E:Ol\JOMIC DEVEIOPMENT'

A. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) should be rrodified t o provide
better financing and greater access into the U.S . of Caribbean
products, and particular efforts must be make to broaden the benefits
of the initative beyond a small privileged group.
The recent e ffor ts of some mo...JTibers of congress , particularly
CongressrrP_n Sam Gibbons CD- Fla.) and J . J. Pickle CD-Tex.) , to expand
the 4- vear old CBI are laudable. Allowing duty-free imports of
clothing made from American fabrics and increasing the sugar import
quotas for 12 Caribbean nati ons would contribute greatly to the
economic well be ing and security of the region . It is unfortunate
that harmful protectionist considerations did not allow these and
other similarly progressive mo__asures to be part of the original law
passed in 1983 . It is a well recognized fact that unless the nations
of the Caribbean gain greater access to the U. S. for their products,
the developmental goals of the CBI VJOuld not be rea lized .
The opposition to expa nded access for clothing and sugar i l lustrates
the fundamental problems of the CBI and previous such efforts to
promote developrrent in the Caribbean : These efforts are entirely
subject to national considerations of the U. S .
The CBI, like other s uch efforts in the past , l acks sufficient inputs

from the recipient nations. No regional consensus was developed. The
U.S. traditionally has dealt wi t h each nation in the region
individually. None is strong enough to effectively defend its own
interest or those of the region.

The one- sidedness of these efforts also destroys the element of
predictability. The U.S. is free to change its policy without
consultations or negotiations with the nations of the region . The
absence of a regional agreement makes this possible . The lack of
predictabilitv affects not only government officials but also
entrepreneurs from the U.S. and the recepient nations . Without
predictability investment is difficult to attract.
Regular consultations and genuine cooperation among all the nations of
the region are needed . A special meeting of the U.S. , Canada, and the
nations of the region to dev ise ways in which products from the region
can gain greater access to the U.S. and Canada at fairer prices should
be considered . The U.S . should refrain from encumbering developrnoJ1t
initiati ves with short-sighted security or domestic political
considerations. Grea ter value must be placed on the fact that the
national security interests of the U.S. are best protected by the
encouragement of an integrated economy in which no country or region
is the victim of unfair terms of trade.
B. Every effort must be made to avoid direct of indirect military
interventions in the region since development efforts cannot succeed
in an environrrioJ1t dominated by military conflicts .
The U.S. h~s a long history of military intervention in the region
(often referred to as "our backyard"). Tragically, U.S. interventions
have contributed to regional instabi lity and deepened the skepticism
of the Caribbean people regarding U. S. intentions in the region.
Historically, the U.S. has intervened to blunt what it perceives as
threats to our way of life. Presently, the focus is on preventing a
"corrmunist beachhead." Arguably, each time the U.S. intervenes, it
concedes its own failure to build a sound political and economic base
in the region. Given American economic power and the genuine
affection people in the region have for many aspects of ZIJnerican life,
it should not require too much genius to devise _policies that would
make military intervention unnecessary.
The U.S. has failed to pay sufficient attention to the plight of the
people of the region. Too often we have associated too closely and
openly with ruling elites hated by the rnasess of suffering people.
This association with the objects of mass hatred and distrust has left
the region open to outside influence . Ironically, the U.S. has
exhibited little concern about the cost of militarily rolling back
penetration by outside forces even when that cost far exceeds that for
meaningful deve lopmental aid .

,

..
We need not wait unti l military force is deemed necessary . Military
intervention perp2tuates dictatorships and misery . Entrepreneurs
cannot be expected to invest in productive industries when the region
is rife with conflict . Danestic elites who believe the U.S . will
support them in the name of fighting communism, have few incentives to
strive for

justice and equality. The 1980 ' s should mark the end of the era of
U. S. military inte~ventionism in the Caribbo___an region . The 1990's
should usher in a period during which the U.S., through enlightened
supp:::>rt for free and more equitable trade, ensures that the bonds
between the American and Caribbean people 'WOuld be impervious to
hostile outside machin3tions.
C. The U.S. Should Develop ~Comprehensive Plan
And Economic Development In Haiti

~o

Promote Derrocracy

H3iti, the poorest country in the western hemisphere, deserves
special attention in U. S. foreign policy for several co~lling
reasons. After three decades of dictatorship under the regimes of
Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier, Haiti has reached a critical stage
in its political development . Jean- Claude Duvalier's flight from
Haiti on February 7, 1986 unleashed long- repressed desires for
democratic government while at the same time r einforcing resistance to
change .
Beyond the cries for political and social change , a severe economic
crisis has gripped the country and threatens i ts very future . Haiti ' s
6 million people are victimized by poor health conditions, an
illiteracy rate of over 80 percent, environmental devastation , chronic
unemployment, and an approximate per capita income of only $300 per
year .
Haiti ' s problems are the direct result of rapacious outside
interventions and an almost unbroken series of corrupt and incompetent
governments . Haiti ' s history has been to a great extent one of
pol itical turmoil fuel ed by foreiqn occupat ion and ruthless i ndigenous
l eadership.
U. S. involvement in Haiti has long been predicated on t\~ concerns: 1.
That no foreign power exercise control over a territory so c l ose to
t he U. S . ; and 2. That the U. S. have access to its resources . Spurred
by t hese t'WO concerns , the U. S. occupied the country from 1915 t o
1934 , during which thousands of Haitians were kill ed by U.S . marines .
Since then , except for brief periods of estrangements , the U. S. has
maintained close ties with all Haitian r egimes .
For most of the 29 year rule of the Duvalie r s , U. S. poli tical a nd
economic relations wit h Haiti were steady . Arrerican corporati ons
avail ed themsel ves of abundant cheap labor in the country and little
effort was made by e i ther ~rican admini strations or corporations to

combat the pervasi ve abuses of human rights .
The event s leading up to the forced exile of J ean-Cl aude Duvalier
created a new appreciation of U.S . rol e and responsibility in Haiti .
Even the Reagan administration saw the need for urgent action to
arrest t he rapidly deteriorating sit uation . There is presentl y a
c l ear recognition that failure to act Y.Duld mean further misery for
Haitians, and provide opportunities for intervention by outside forces
inimical to U.S. i nterests. The question now is how best to act? We
believe that the U.S. needs to devel op a comprehens ive policy toward
Haiti which \l.lOuld address the following four areas : 1. Building
Democracy; 2. Inmigrati on; 3. AIDS ~ssis tance ; and 4. Economic
Development Ass istance .
1. Building Democracy : The U. S . should take strong and vigorous
ffi2asures to ensure that the desire among the Haitian peopl e f or
democracy not be thwarted. Arrong these measures, the following are
essential . First, the U.S. should not provide military aid to the
current governing Council. U. S. military assistance at 1 . 6 million
(FY87), while only a fracti on of total U.S . assistance, serves only to
hurt the Haitian majority. Haiti is not at war and its military
arsenal has thus far been used only against its people . Since Jeanclaude Duvalier's forced departure , hundreds have died at the hands of
the military i n protest of government actions not un li ke those
exper i enced under Duvalier. Second , through diplomatic and other
means, Washington s hould pressure the provisional governrnc--nt to
maintain its promises and time t ables for r eturning Baiti to full
democratic rule . Every precaution should be taken to ensure that this
occurs in an a tmosphere f ree of {X)litical v iolence and intimidation .
Third , U.S . pol i cy must support local initiatives and efforts aimed at
building l ong- lasting derrocratic processes and institutions .
2 . Irnnigra tion: More than any other group seeking entry int o the
U. S. , Haitians have been subjected to discriminatory and sometimes
cruel treatment by U.S . irrmigrati on authorities . The records show
that a mere 2 percent have been granted asylum. Many are still
deta ined in unsanitary, overcro....Ued a nd generally unsuitable
faci lities often located in the fros t belt . Such discriminatory
practices which t hreaten t he very lives of Haitian immigrants and
r efugees must be ended . Similarly, those provisions in the
Irrmigrati on Act that discriminate against farm- guest ¥X:>rker programs
t hat are dominated by Haitian workers should be reformed .

Economic Development Assistance : Haiti ' s dire economic condition
requires a long term pol icy commitment from the U. S. t o attack not
only its symptoms but its causes. Efforts should be made to improve
trade policies as outlined in the provisions of the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI) so that Haiti, like other Caribbean nations, can
b=nef it from improved access and financing for its products . Such
efforts should be aimed at lifting tariffs and other barriers to
trade.
U. S. investments in Haiti should be made consistent with government
policies to enhance development . Arrerican companies in Haiti need to
respect and orovide fair treatment to Haitian workers and the labor

movement. Calls for wage increases, employment b<=>...nefits, and other
COffiP°....11Sation must be addressed adequately and properly. Finally, the
U. S. should rrake a longterm corrmitment to providing substantial
economic assistance . Particular attention should be paid to technical
assistance in agriculture, and protection of the rapidly deteriorating
environment.
Current U.S. economic assistance to Haiti at $102 . 7 million CFY87)
should, at a minimum, be m:iintained. The United States should ensure
that this aid b<=>Jlefit the people of Haiti and not a SID3.ll elite.
Indeed, the Special Foreign ~sistance Act of 1986 require that the
aid be given only under certain conditions. The conditions include:
improvements in hurran rights, fiscal accountability, free elections ,
free and functioning associations, and cooperation in implementing
development projects . Despite the widely recognized failure of the
Haitian government to meet these conditions, the Reagan administration
has certified economic (and military) assistance . The Ainerican
government should derrand greater compliance with these reasonable and
necessary conditions.
AIDS Assistance: For hurranitarian and national interest
considerations, the U. S. should provide both emergency and long term
assistance in comb3.ting the AIDS tragedy. Even though the Centers For
Disease Control in Atlanta has rescinded its 1982 classification of
Haitians as a separate "risk group" for tl-ie disease, AIDS is a major
health problem in Haiti . The first AIDS-related infection was
diagnosed in 1979. Todav, there are more than 1500 AIDS patients in
the country, over 40 percent of whom are women. ~he worst fears of
health professionals- that heterosexual intercourse will become the
dominant mode of tra nsmission , infecting men and women almost equallyare already being realized in this impoverished nation.
U.S. interest in helping to stop the spread of the disease comes
primarily from the fact that Haiti is just 600 miles from the Florida
coast . Moreover, medical experts believe that the disease in Haiti is
at a stage today where t he U. S. epidemic will be in years unless
progress is made in halting it. United States involvement in
combatting the disease i n Haiti would provide American health
professionals with invaluable knowlege and experience about the
disease. The United States should therefore begin a joint public
education and research program with the Haitian government . For such a
program to be successful, the United States would need to provide
training for Haitian medical professional3, access to Am2rican
facilities as well as necessary funding.
We are convinced that these recommendations provide a starting point
for our government to demonstrate its support of the Haitian people
and their renewed efforts to build a better life.

III .

SOUTHERN AFRICA

A new U. S . pol icy toward aparthei d should -=mphasize South Africa ' s
ro l e in destabil i zing the r egion and the necessity for coordinated
international pressures to bring about negotiations between the
apartheid r egime and its 09ponents. The basi~ e l ements of such a
policy would be :

A.

A.

Comprehensive U. S. and UN security council rrandated
economic and diplorratic sanctions designed to isolate
South Africa and deprive the apartheid s ystem of outside
capital and technology.

B.

Substantial economic support and corrmit.rnoJ1t t o the
independence of the nations of the Southe rn Africa
Development Coordination Co~ference (SAD::::C) which now face
direct and indirect military and economic assaults from
apartheid South Africa.

C.

"Recognition of the government of Angola and an end
to U. S . s upport for the South African sponsored Unita
rebel group seeki ng to overt hrow this governments .

D.

I ncreased emergency and developmental assistance to the
government of Mozambique and condemnation of the
terrorist group, Renamo, and its South African supporters

E.

Support for the unconditional withdrawal of South
occupation troops fro~ Namibia and t.~e immediate
inde?endence under UN guidelines of that nation.

~frican

United States and United Nations Security Council Econcmic and
DiploI113tic Sanctions .

The 1986 anti - apart heid act was a firm reject ion of the Reagan policy
of construct ive engagement and a step toward a new policy that i s both
rroral l y correct as we l l as consistent with l ong- term U. S . national
interests . However, due to the intense hostility of the
administrati on , t he sanctions contained in t he Act did not go far
enough . Moreover , the law had too many l oopho l es which have si nce
been exploited by tbe administration to the benefit of the apartheid
regime .
The t ime has come to improve upon this law and to br i ng other nati ons
together in a concerted effort to deprive the apartheid regime of t he
cri tical support i t continues to recei v~ f r om the i nternational
community . U.S. leadership i s today as impor tant as ever . The other
western nations and Japa n c l early are wait i ng for t he U. S. to seize

the initiative and formulate a realistic str3tegy for promoting
peaceful change in South Afri ca.
The recent strike by over 300,000 black miners in South Africa firmly
de.'TIOnstrated the resolve and corrmitment of black South Africans to end
apartheid . The strike and the repeated affirmation of support for
international sanctions by the rrajor labor unions u.1dercut one of t he
ffi3.in objections t o the imposition of sanctions: Black workers oppose
sanctions because the w.::>uld lose their jobs . These strikers had no
strike fund and knew that there were numerous unemployed people who
could be used to replace them. Yet they , like other black South
Africans, were willing to risk their relative economic security in
their struggle for freedom, dignity and justice .
It should also be pointed out that the increased s tubbornness of the
apartheid regime hardly demonstrates the ineffectiveness of sanctions .
In fact, sanctions have not yet had an opportunity to work even in a
limited form . The ~dministration has done everything it can to
undermine the sanctions law and has not discouraged other nations from
doing business as usual with South Africa . Indeed, as the Iran-2ontra
hearings showed, this administration rraintai~ed extensive diplomatic
and milit;;iry ties with apartheid South Z\frica contrary to both the
letter and spirit of the anti- apartheid law. Such ti~s could not
have failed to convey to the apartheid regime that the rrove toward
sanctions was only superficial .
Hence, the first order of business is to toughen the current antiapartheid law. 0Jrrent efforts in Congress to impose a comprehensive
trade embargo on South Africa w.:>uld do this and we support them. In
particular, the following actions are essential :
1.

Prohibit U. S . oil companies from any involverno....nt in the
procurement and refining of oil for South Africa .

2.

Prohibit the iITii.')Ortation or sale i n the United States of
diamonds originating from South Africa .

3.

Prohibit U. S. banks from any financial dealings with
public or private entities operating in South Africa .

4.

Cl ose all South African consulates in the U. S. , prohibit
military or intelligence cooperati on with South African
agenci es , and reduce diplomatic relations between the two
countries to a minimum.

In conjunction with these actions, the U. S. should seize the
initiative in the UN Security Council (as i t is now doing vis a vis
the Iran-Iraq war) to institute an embargo on South ~frica . For too
long the U. S . has acted to protect apartheid South Africa by joining
in the veto of economi c sanctions against South Africa under chapter
Seven of the UN charter . This policv must now be r~versed . A
multinational effort to pressure South Africa originating in the UN
Security Council is the surest way of letting the South African regime
know that the w.:>rld comnunity is sincere and determined in its calls
for an immediate end to apartheid.

B.

Aid to SAOCC

The U. S. must derronstrate a clear corrmitment to t he independence of
the nations of southern Africa which have joined t o f orm the Southern
Africa Coordination Conference (SZ\OCC) in an effort to reduce South
Africa ' s economic stranglehold on the region . So far t he U.S., unlike
rrs.ny western nations such as Canada , Britain , Sweden , and Norway , has
sent a discouraging message in response to SAICC's pleas for
assistance . Aid from the U. S. has been slow in corning. The amount
that has been comnitted s o far is well below reasonable expectation
and it is encurnbP....red with unreasonable restrictions . In addition ,
American military su9port for t he South African sponsored Unita rebels
in Angola and. private financ i a l and propaganda support for Renamo in
Mozambique have not helped .
SAOCC needs massive a.~oun ts of aid i.rrunediately . Its members not onlv
have to contend with inefficient structures and relation s hips fostered
during the colonial period, they have to defend thei r limited gains
agai nst direct South Afr ica military aggression as well as indirect
attacks by South A.frica's surrogates - of which Unita and Renamo are
only the more prominent.
SAIX:C ' s rrai~ efforts are directed toward rebui l ding and improv ing
transport and com~unications infrastructure essential to sustained
economic growth . While SAD:C's efforts ar e spearheaded by the s everal
governi-ne.nts, the private sector has been given a prominent role .
Many large western corporati ons are invol ved in t he projects .
The U.S . should take an active role in the multinational efforts to
assist the economies of the nine SAIX:C nations. The apartheid regime
should be left with no doubt that the U. S. r egards its campaign of
destabilization as a threat t o world peace and security .
Congress is cons i dering for the 1988 fiscal year a $50 mi llion aid
package for the reg ion . Not only is this amount extremely small when
compared to the needs of the region and aid given by much smaller
European nations , it is offset by the substantial military aid bei ng
provided t o Unita . SAO:C has estimated the damage wrought by South
Africa and its surrogates such as Unita and renamo at more than $10
billion over the past five years. In additon, t he aid package is
subject to so many conditi ons Cnainly directed against Angola) that it
nay be more a burden than a benefit to the regio~ .
The aid amount should be substa ntially increased . A long term
corrmitment to the region should be articulated. Pinally , there must
be a clear r ecognition of t he r ole Unita and other South African
sponsored terror groups play in destabi lizing the region . Supl_X)rt for
Unita or any of these other groups contri butes directly to the plight
of all of the people of southern Africa and furt her delays t he
eradication of apartheid.
C. Recognition of Angolan government and end to military assistance
to South African sponsored Unita r ebels .

The refusal of the U. S . government to recognize the government of
:l\ngola is 3. uain contributor to regional i nsecurity in southern
Africa . This situation has been worsened by the repeal of the Clark
AffioJldmoJlt which had prohibited U. S. assistance to rebels in .l\ngola .
Today, Angola, a resource- rich nation that rraintains excellent
relations wi th many U.S . corporations , cannot feed its people .
Unita
rebels have driven people from the countryside and halted agriculture
by sowing fields and roads with anti-personnel mines . The expressed
goal of Unita and South Africa is to burden the Angolan government
with a population unable t o produce.
There have been also UBny well documented attempts by t his proapartheid conspiracy to destroy ~ngola's oi l industry which is rra.naged
by U.S . companies . These attacks on U. S. citizens and business
interests have not , surprisingly , generated t he concern or
conde.'1U1ation that would nor.rally be expected from the U. S. government .
U.S. officials have admitted that the :l\ngola has no independent
strategic val ue to the U.S.
The principal obsession of the Reagan
administration has been the presence of Cuban troops invited by the
.l\ngolan government to help it repel South ~rican backed invasions .
The Angolans and Cubans have expressed their r eadiness to withdraw
Cuban troops if South Afr ica w:>uld remove its for c es from southern
Angola and illegall y occup i ed Namibia. The U.S . , ado9ting South
Afr ica ' s position on the issue , has conditioned the indepencence of
Namibia and recognition of the Angolan government on the withdrawal of
Cuban troops from Angola .
It is obvious that South Africa, which already control s large areas of
Angola , w::>uld move to overthrow the .l\ngolan governrnent if the Cubans
v.iere to leave now.
Meanwhile the war a nd the corresponding misery continue as mil l ions of
dollars worth of American weapons strengthen Unita . The Angolan
government is forced to spend its limited resources combatting Unita
which i s expanding its att acks on Angola's economic and social
infrastructure .
Essentially , the U. S. has cooper ated with South Africa ' s regiona l
destabilization strategy even a s the .l\ngolan government seeks better
ties . The U. S. TrnlSt r everse its course . The Angolan government should
be r ecogn ized and Unita should be den i ed U.S . assistance. These
actions , toge ther with support for the immediate withdrawal of South
African occupation forces from Namibia , v.Duld go a long way toward
reducing tension and insecurity in the region .

D. I ncreased Emergency a nd Developmental Assistance for Mozambique
a nd Condemnation of Renamo/MNR and their South African supporters.

In 1984-85, Mozambique suffered a famine in which over 100,000 people
died . Today, Mozambique is facing a famine of historic proportions.
About five million of its over 14 million people are at risk . This
famine and the previous one are not, however, the result of drought or
other environmental condition. According to the UN, Mozambique ' s food
crises are the r esult of a vicious campaign being waged by t he
insurgent Renamo/MNR group.
Renamo , created by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence organization in
1977, came under the direction and control of South Africa when the
white minority regime collapsed in ~hodesia. Today, it is a principa l
element of apartheid ' s campaign of destabilization against the
independent states of southern Africa .
Mozambique has received special attention from South Africa because of
its strategic location astride the Indian Ocean and the closeness of
its borders with rrajor urban centers of South Africa . Three rrajor
transport routes connect much of southern Africa to Mozambican ports
on the Indian ocean. Unhampered use of the Beira corridor, the Nacala
line and the Limi:opo line would save these nations hundreds of
millions of dollars a year . Due to the cam.oaign of terror and
destruction carried out by South African trained and armed Renamo
insurgents, these nations are forced to use routes going through South
Africa at great costs to their economies and independence.

The government of Mozambique, after experimenting with economic
policies that it now acknowledges as failures, has rroved rapidly to
institute reforms emphasizing rrarket forces . It joined the world bank
and the IMF in 1986 and has boosted agricultural prices while
devaluing its currency . Its efforts have received praise from the
international corrmunity, including the Reagan administration .
The U.S. has been generous in providing emergency assistance-- $75
million was pledged in 1987 . The U. S. also has provided $10 million a
year in developITP._nt assistance directed toward the private sector .
The late President Samora Machel of Mozambique was warmly received in
the U. S . in 1985 . President Joaquim Chissano also paid a successful
visit in early October of 1987 . 'I'he public position of the U. S.
government has been one of strong support for the Mozambican
government and a rejection of Renamo .

.

However , extreme rightwing groups have launched a rrassive campaign to
reverse U. S . policy and win recognition for Renamo . A 1977
congressional r estriction on all non- food assistance rerrains in
effect . This has prevented the U.S. from joining other western
nations such as Britain in providi ng some assistance to counter the
attacks of Renamo. Britain, for exainple, trains Mozambican troops .
Sweden, Canada, Norway, and Italy have been especially generous in
providing Mozambique wi th developmo._ntal assistance . All of the
parties helping Mozambique , however , agree on one thing: the U. S.
needs to play a rrore active role .
Congress should immediately repeal the r estrictions on U.S . aid to

Moza'Tlbique which, in light of the increasingly close ties between the
two nations , are unnecessary. The U. S. must act firmly to discourage
South African sponsorship of Rename and provide necessary assistance
to the Mozambicans to enable them to resist South African aggression .
Finally , the U. S. must expand its role in Mozambique ' s developmental
efforts and encourage participation by U.S . business interests as part
of an overall strategy to assist srux:c .
E.

Independence for Na.mi bia

When the Reagan administration took office i n 1981, independence for
Namibia was its principal African policy goal. Seven years later ,
this goal is no closer to realization now than i t was then . Reagan
administration policy toward Namibia has failed completely.
The primary reason for this failure is U. S. inability to separate its
national interests from those of South ~frica, whose troops illegally
occupy Namibia. The U.S . , echoing South ~rica's demands, has linked
the withdrawal of South African troops from N3.'llibia to the withdrawal
of Cuban troops from neighboring Angola. The U. S. has refused to
distinguish between the Cuban troops who are i n ~gola at t he
invitation of the Angolan governmo...nt and South ~frican troops who
remain in Namibia contrary to United Nations resolutions and decicions
of the International Court of Justice .
Namibia , a former Gerrran colony, was occupied by South African troops
during World War I . The South P.fricans received a mandate from the
League of Nations i n 1920 to administer the territory. This mandate
was terminated by the United Nations in 1966 . The United Nations
Security, Council later declared South Africa's continued occupation
of Namibia illegal and de11anded the withdrawal of its forces in 1969 .
The UN position was affirmed by the International Court of Justice in
1971. In 1973, the UN General Assembly recognized the South West
African Peoples Organization (SWl\PO) -- a liberation movement waging
armed struggle against South Africa's occupation anny -- as the "sole
and authentic representative of the Namibian people . "
South Africa ' s continued occupation of ~amibia is clearly based on its
fear that SWAPO would win any free and fair election in Namibia . The
apartheid regime worries that independence for Namibia under the
leadership of SWA..PO would encourage domestic anti- apartheid forces .
Tragically, it is now evident that the Reagan administration supports
South Africa ' s position .
While appa--aring to work for Namibian independence , the U. S. has
demonstrabl y aided South Africa's intransi gence . As the leader of a
five nation group ( The Contact Group) --which also includes Britain,
canada , France , and West Gerrrany - the U. S. under the Reagan
administration , has been rrost supportive of South Africa's concerns .
The U. S . should end its close association with South Africa on the
issue of Namibia. The U. S. should support the UN position without
reservations such as the linkage to Cuban troop withdrawa l from
ne ighboring Angol a . UN resolution 435 which calls for an end to South
Africa ' s i l l egal administration of Namibia and the holding of UN-

supervised elections shoul d be t he basis of a just resolution of the
Namibia i ssue.
Peace and j ustice will not come to Namibia if the U. S. continues its
close collaboration with South Africa. U.S . support for Unita rebels
--which operate out of Namibia, and are protected by the South African
military -- and the linkage of Namibian i ndependence to the issue of
Cuban troops i n Angola are key obstacles to the indePo.__ndence of
Namibia and to the attainrnoJ1t of regional peace and security.

IV.
A.

HUMZ\N RIGHTS AND U. S. DEVElDPME!.\TI' ASSISTANCE

U. S . ASSISTAJ\JCE SHOULD BE CDNDITIONED ON RESPEX:T
FDR HUM1\N RIGfITS

The U. S. has been selective in conde.'11ning violati ons of basic human
rights in sub- Saharan Africa and this policy is damaging U.S.
interests in the region. The U.S . needs to return to a policy of
acti ve advocacy of respect for hwran rights. Some of the worst
violat ors of hurran rights in Africa continue to receive
disproportionately l arge amounts of U.S. aid . To co!TlfX)und the gravity
of the situati on , much of the aid goes t o support the
military/security establishments of these countries .
The highly visibl e American presence, in nations with obvious official
corruption, abject poverty, and government repression, contributes to
a growing negative perception of the U.S. role in Africa . current
U.S. policy places too much emphasis on the perceived friendliness of
particular regimes and not enough on what t~e people o f these
countries believe about U. S. complicity in their oppress i on .
Even though the er~dication of the apartheid s vstem under which black
South Africans are f orced to live rerrains our primary concern, we
r e cognize the need t o p romote respect for huma.n rights throughout
Africa.
We see a particular value in preventiDg U.S . subsidv of
huma n rights violations in countries which receive substantial U.S .
economic or security assistance . We are firmly convinced that by
adopting a pr incipled and consistent position in support of human
rights , including conditioni ng U.S . aid on a minimum l evel of respect
for human rights, the U.S. can set an example which will inevi t ably
cont ribute to a more humane a nd progress i ve Africa .
In viewing the status of human rights throughout sub- Saharan Af rica ,
we are moved t o cite the following countries (i n addition to South
Africa and Namibia) as examples of cases where the U.S. should TTBke
special efforts to promote greater respect for fundament al hurran

rights: Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia and Zaire . We believe, for reasons
given below, that these countries illustrate the excesses of tyranical
leadership which have contributed as much as anything else to the
difficulties confronting Africa. In Ethiopia and Zaire, we are deeply
disturbed by gravity of the abuses and the entrenched nature of
governillent control of people in both countries. In the cases of Kenya
and Liberia, we see abuses of lesser rragnitude. However, the
potential exists in each of these two countries for a serious
escalation of abuse. We have suggested concrete means by which the
U.S. can begin the process of influencing these regimes toward greater
concern for the hunBn rights of their citizenry :
Ethiopia
The so-called rrarxist government of President Mengistu Haile Mariam
has established a disturbing record of disrespect for the rights of
its citizens . Its behavior has shredded the great hopes and
expectations of peopl e all over the w:::>rld who thought the 1974 coup
against the despotic Emperor Haile Selassie ~uld usher in greater
freedoms for Ethiopians.
The Mengistu regime attempts to justify its ruthlessness by blaming it
on various insurgencies and outside threats. We reject the view that
a state of war or emergency justifies absolute power residing in an
individual or a total denial of fundamental hurra.n rights. Certain
fundamental human rights should never be abridged by any government
under any circumstance.
It is well established by reputable and impartial international hurra.n
rights organizations that torture, extra- judicial executions,
disapp<=>---arances, detentions without charge , forced resettlemo__nts
resulting in separation of family moJTlbers , all take place on a regular
basis in Ethiopia. Freedom of speech and press , freedom of rrovement,
freedom of peaceful assembly or association, and legal or peaceful
means of changing the governi~ent are non- existent. There is every
reason to believe that at l east a substantial number of Ethiopians are
not supportive of the Mengistu regime. In fact over l million
Ethiopi ans are i n voluntary or forced exile .
We are mindful of the threats facing ~1e regime, the non-democratic
nature of ffi3.ny of its opponents, and the considerable opposition among
rrany Ethiopians and Africans to efforts which ~uld further divide the
country. We oppose American military aid to any of the warring
factions and countries in the area . We do not believe that the
legitirra.te grieviances of the groups in that area can be resolved by
either war or repression . We call on all of the parties to seek
peaceful means of resolving their differences .
Bowever, we believe governments have particular responsibilities for

defending human right s. The Ethiopian government has not lived up to
its share of the r espons i bility . Until it begins to do so we are
impelled to r e corrmend the following actions:
1.

That the U. S. government devise and institute a set of
economic sanctions that would deprive the Ethiopian
governmo._nt of foreign exchange which it has used almost
exclusively to prosecut e the war and r epress its
opponents .
Since U. S.-Ethiopia trade is made up almost exclusivel y
of sales of Ethiopian coffee in the U. S.($68 million in
1987) , sanctions would mean an end to th is trade .

2.

That t he U.S. continue to provide s ubstantial humanitar i an
assistance to the peopl e of Ethi opia suffering from
conntinued famine.

3.

That the U. S. aggressivel y publicize the deplorable
hurran rights record of the Ethiopian government until
there is a change in that government's policy t oward
hUil\3.n rights.

Kenya
Over the past 10 years , Kenya has moved from being one of :n.frica ' s
freest countries to one where all power is concentrated in t he hands
of one man, President Daniel Arap Moi , head of the sole political
party , the Kenyan African Union CK:n.N""u). According to Amnesty
International a nd other reliabl e hurran rights groups, pJli tical
detentions, harassment , and torture are routine i n present day Kenya .
At least two people have died i n police cust ody in recent m:)nths .
Thousands of Kenyans have gone into exile to escape the increasingly
repressive r eg ime .
The Kenyan governmo._nt's r espJnse to charges of r epression has been to
issue vehem~nt denials and question the motives of its critics. There
appears to be no effort to rectify t he deteriorating political
situation in the country .
The U. S. government which is one of Kenya's princ ipal benefac tors , has
sought persist entl y to downplay the gravity of r ights violations in
the country. I t appears that the Re agan administration accepts the
Kenyan governmo._n t ' s pos ition that its actions are necessitated by
agitation of an underground dissident group, "MWakenya. " The fact is
that ordinary citi zens who peacefully criticize the government have
been subjected to political intimidation .
Concern about the deteriorating situation in Kenya has l ed
congressional authorities to impose conditions on fu ture U. S.
assistance to Kenya . Improvements in the human rights situation would
be required before Kenya, which received about $74 million last year
from the U. S . in economic and mi li tary assistance , r eceives the $53
million it is s l ated t o get t hi s yea r .
We support the efforts by members of congress and human rights

activist to rrake the Kenyan government pay closer attention to its
hurren rights proble.'llS . We urge ci1e administration to confront the Moi
government on these issues and support efforts to condition additional
U.S. aid on progress in dealing with them
Liberia
Since coming to power in a bloody coup in 1980, former sergeant Samuel
K. Doe has presided over one of Africa's most ruthless and incapable
regimes . Through summary and frequently public executions , torture,
detentions and other forms of abuse, President Doe and his
undisciplined army have decirreted opposition to his rule. Objective
observers paint a picture of Liberia as a countrv ruled by terror .
Throughout all of this, the Reagan administration has adopted a
passive posture, frequently straining to find a positive dev2loprno,_nt
out of chaos and obvious repression.
Liberia receives per capita the largest amount of U.S. economic and
military assistance given to Africa. Last year U. S. assistance
totalled $58 , 573 , 000. The amount requested for 1987 was reduced to
under $41 million. The Reagan administration's response to criticisms
of the U. S. role in buttressing the Doe regime has been to cite the
historical ties between the t~ countries and to stress Liberia's
strategic value .
We recognize the historical relationship between our two countries
since the founding of Liberia by some of our ancestors, and we know
L~at the U.S. maintains vital corrrnunications facilities in the
C'Ountry . However, we reject absolutely the view that the U. S . should
ignore gross human rights violations and misuse of U.S . assistance in
order to maintain this relationship.
We supix>rt the limited action already taken as a result of
congressional pressures to better monitor and account for U.S . aid to
the country. We fully support the adoption of restrictions which
would condition additional aid to improve.~ents in the hurran rights
record of the Doe regime and on recognizable movement toward a multiparty dem::>cratic society. The U.S . has too much invested in Liberia .
~o other country in Africa is linked more closely to the U. S.
If we
acquiesce in the development of a tyrannical a nd co~rupt regime in
Liberia, we will be judged forever harshly by fTk3.ny Z\fricans.
Zaire
Zaire with a population of almost 31 million , is ruled by Africa's
most enduring tyrant, Mobutu Sese Seko . Indeed, t he only good thing
his friends usually have to say about him is that he has rranaged to
survive for 22 years in a C'Ountry that has seen some of Africa ' s most
violent C'Onflicts . President Mobutu has survived because of
unsurpassed ruthlessness and C'Qnsiderable U. S. economic and military
assistance. Mobutu, like Doe in Liberia has, been supported almost
blindly by the current and past U. S . administrations . In turn, M:>butu

has readily allowed his country to be used by various western nations,
including the U. S., for diverse purposes . Presently , Zaire is
reportedly being used by the U.S . to supply Unita rebels in .l\ngola
with U. S . weapons .
Even the Reagan administration acknowledges the widespread repression
in Zaire. Mobutu has developed a ITl3.ssive military and security
network to ensure his t otal control. Political killings, torture ,
disappearances, exile, and rampant violence are common. In addition,
corruption has b2en essentially legitimized by Mobutu, his family and
close associates . He is widely considered to be one of the richest
men in the world . In a resource-rich country , the people renain in
abject poverty even as Mobutu lives and travels in luxury .
We believe that current U. S. policy toward Zaire is not in the longterm best interests of the U. S. There is so much opposition to Mobutu
and what he he represents, that it is only a IT\3.tter of time before he
or his system is replaced. The U.S. should move to dissociate itself
from the Mobutu regime. U.S. military aid t o Zaire should be ended .
Economic assistance should be conditioned on the following three
factors : Concrete irn_orovements in the hurran rights situation in the
country, better accounting of how U.S . aid is spent, and definite
movement toward a democratic society .
We are strongly opposed to the increasing U. S. military build-up in
Zaire and the use of the country to tranship arms to .l\ngolan rebels .
This development will result in increasing tension between Zaire and
its neighbors. We are particularly opposed to efforts being IT\3.de to
expand a military base at Kamina in Southwestern Zaie. We believe
that this base could be used only to expand the already deplorable
r ela tionship between the U. S. and South African supported rebels in
the region . We view the Kamina base as a grave threat to peace and
democracy both in Zaire and the entire region.

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE POSITIVE STEPS
'ID PROM<Jrg "DEVEIDPMENT WITH WJMEN"
The Uni ted States should rrake add i tional efforts to ensure the full
participation of women in U.S.-sponsored African and Caribbean
development projects . In particular , i t should require and monitor
action-oriented procedures from both the U. S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and from multil ateral aid agencies to which it
contributes .
There are 4 areas of special concern : l )aid agency procedures;
2lreproductive heal th ; 3lagricultural programs; and 4)training and
education.

1.

U.S . 1\ID and other deve lopment organizations should be recy1ired to

rrore effectively carry out its mandate to work on deve lopl1¥".J1t with
women
-- issues .
Wa.11en and development should be of agency- wide concern .
should be addressed in three ways :

This concern

a)all agency sta ff should receive training in the integration of Y\Dmen
into a ll c urrent and future devel opment projects;
b)'WOmen should have inout into project procedures from planning to
evaluation; and
c)all project evaluations should include project results regardi ng
development with women issues .
I n turn, the United States should authorize and maintain adequate
appropriations to international agencies which derronstrate effect ive
developmo.J1t with women programs.
2.

The United States should rrake reproductive health a priority in

development planning.
Many African and Caribbo--an countries have some of the highest rates of
population growth in the v.orld. This is occurring while their abil ity
to provide for their people is threatened by declining comrrodity
prices , drought, domestic and international economic mismanagement,
political instablity, military incursions, and inadequate
international aid levels .
The United States should respond t o this need in 2 areas:
a) The U. S . should restore aid to international population p::>licy
organi zations such as the United Nations Fund for Popul ation
Activities and the International Planned Parenthood Federation.
African and Car i bbP....an countries need the organizational and f inancial
resources that can be provided by U. S.-funded interna t ional PJpulat ion
agencies to hel p them develop appropriate populati on poli c i es .
b )All U. S. funded organizations, however , should be required to
address i ssues of access to contraceptives and inf ormation about the ir
use; contraceptive side e f fects and appropriate fol l ow-up health care ;
coercion ; and the need for increased training of i nd i genous 'WOITP.J1 as
popul ation policy p l anners and .reproductive health workers .
Additional e f forts i n t hese areas will reduce the number of high- risk
( too early, too late , or too closel y- spaced) pregnanci es among African
and Cari bbean v.Dmen . This focus can he lp reduce t he high rate of
infant and maternal death in these regions from both high- r i sk

pregnancies and illegal abortions , and provide corrmuniti es with
greater abi lity to determine the distribution of their resources.
3.

United States funded agencies should provide rrore agricult ural

Extension services to African and

Caribbo~n

womo--11.

I n some Caribbean countries , 40 % of the agricultural l abor is
performed by wo::nen . African womo,_n produce 80% of the food produced on
the continent . In light of this situation , developmo,_nt projects aimed
at prorroting self- sufficiency in food production must address the
needs of women farmers in the following ways :
a)technical assistance, training , and c redit must be extended to
women ;
b)developlTlP...nt agencies should urge government reforms of land tenure
and inheritance laws that impact adversely on women; and
c)financial support must be provided to individual women and ¥.Dmen ' s
cooperatives which have already found efficient food production
methods.
4.

The t ra i ning and education of women and girls should be emphasized

in United States development projects .

While technical training programs and educational access i n general
need to be in=r eased in J\frica and the Cari bbean, s pecial emphasis
should be placed on the training of womo..n. Current figures show that
womoJ1 rrake up only 20% of the developmoJ1t trainees in many
internati onal pro j ects. Women must be trained in both rrore effic ient
methods of performing tasks they already do, and to participate i n
areas in which they previously had little or no access.:
a)Increased efficiency: --wa.~en farmers need technical training i n
rrore efficient farming methods and in the use of new appr opriate
technology.
~wanen entrepreneurs need training in managerial, accounting , and
distribution techniques .
b)Wider opportunities: - - All women need the l iteracy training which
wil l provide them greater access to a wider variety of jobs .
- -Women must receive training and support i n developing t heir own
organi zations .
- -They must gain access to the poli t ical process both as voters and
candidates.
- -They must gain access t o policymaking positions in the business and
international development comnunities.

U. S. AID has already determined that the promotion of activity among
women in the private sector and policies which result in increased
income for 'M:>men are key to achieving general developmo.J1t in Africa
and the Caribbo-..an. The next step is to put into place effective
implementation plans that will rrake this a reality.

